In the 21 st century, new forms of community in dementia are emerging. The existence of these communities challenges the individualisation of the self, which has come to characterise 'person-centred' approaches to dementia care over the last 30 years. In this paper, an alternative approach (the inter-embodied self) is presented. This approach to promoting selfhood in dementia is based on the premise that the self is not an intrinsic aspect of embodied Being but is instead a transactive phenomenon which exits in a perpetual state of becoming. As such, the primary goal of practitioners should not be the fixing, reviving or reunifying of a pre-morbid self but, instead, enabling a rich and polyphonic montage of selves to emerge. Drawing on a short documentary film about experiences of friendship in dementia, the paper concludes by highlighting the potential contribution of the interembodied self to contemporary dementia care.
Part I: Introduction
The shifting landscapes of dementia Dementia is an umbrella term incorporating a wide variety of neurological conditions, including Alzheimer's disease, vascular dementia, dementia with Lewy Bodies, Pick's Disease, alcohol related brain disease and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (Alzheimer's Society, 2012) . The term dementia is derived from the Latin demens (without mind) and emerged in medical parlance during the early 19 th century in order to describe patients whose disability was related to acquired brain damage (Mckeith and Fairbairn, 2009 ).
In the 21 st century, the landscapes of dementia are shifting rapidly (Bartlett, 2012) . The population of people with dementia is expanding and, according to the World Health
Organisation, there will be an additional 646 million people with dementia over the next 40 years; taking the global population to 682 million by the year 2050 (World Health Organisation, 2012) . Developments in medical technologies, such as advances in genetic and pre-symptomatic screening (Sheinerman and Umansky, 2013, Stokholm, et al, 2013) , increasing efficacy of pharmaceutical interventions (Bishara, 2012) , and changes to diagnostic criteria (Lopez, et al, 2011) are facilitating earlier diagnoses and increasing the number of people living with dementia as a chronic form of illness (World Health Organisation, 2012) . Parallel to these developments, people with dementia are increasingly coming together to share experience, forge new communities, establish shared-identities and campaign for social change (Bartlett, 2012 , Bartlett and O'Connor, 2007 , Williamson, 2012 (Taylor, 2013) These shifting landscapes of dementia inspire us to revisit established ways of thinking about the self and the self's relationship to neurological disease. In particular, these 21 st century developments provoke us to question whether the promotion of individuality is a legitimate goal for dementia care policy and practice. In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to promoting selfhood in dementia. This approach, which I term the inter-embodied self, is based on the understanding that human selves are dividual; that is, transacted and reproduced across persons. Thus, the process of becoming self is achieved through dialogical (self-other)
interaction, both at the reflexive (discursive) and pre-reflexive (embodied) levels. As I will argue, viewing the self in this way leads us to consider new principles for organising dementia care, which I label as: respecting dividuality, promoting dialogicality and embracing intercorporeality.
The regime of the (individualised) self in dementia
According to Taylor (1989) and Rose (1996) the self in Western societies is predominantly defined in terms of a profound inwardness, or internal psyche that is bounded within the body and that houses the unique stock of the individual's biography. This view of the self has evolved over centuries as a result of key geo-political developments; specifically, the Protestant Reformation, development of capitalist modes of economic production, the rise of liberal democracies and the growth of Psy forms of governmentality (e.g. psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy). These developments, Rose argues, has led to the regime of the self; implicit expectations that persons are (required to be) autonomous, independent, selfgoverning individuals.
Current UK policy initiatives such as the Personalisation Agenda in England (Department of Health, 2007) , which sets out the principle of self-directed support, and the Dementia Care
Standards in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2011) which enshrine the right to be treated as an individual, exemplify this deep respect (Hughes, Bamford and May, 2008) for the principle of individuality. As Nolan et al (2004) argue, this emphasis on the promotion of individuality is a direct consequence of the rise of 'person-centred' approaches to health and social care. In dementia, person-centred care has been developed primarily through the work of social psychologist, and former school chaplain, Tom Kitwood and that of the Bradford Dementia Group, which Kitwood founded in 1992.
Prior to this period in dementia care history, the onset and progression of dementia was widely associated with an equally progressive and irretrievable loss of self on the part of the sufferer (Cohen and Eisdorfer, 1986, Sweeting and Gilhooly, 1997) . Family members, friends, colleagues and acquaintances were thus exposed to a process of gradual dis-integration whereby the personality and unique characteristics of the person, that they have hitherto known and loved, were steadily eroded during 'a funeral that never ends': (Aronson and Lipkowitz, 1981: 569 (Kitwood, 1999: 3).
Since its inception, the person-centred dementia care movement has produced new regulatory technologies (Foucault, 1988 , Rose, 1996 such as Dementia Care Mapping (Bradford Dementia Group, 1997) and PIECE-dem (Brooker, et al, 2011) , designed to monitor the impact of malignant social psychology and evaluate care quality according to person-centred criteria. These criteria specifically include the extent to which the individuality of the person with dementia is recognised and promoted; as emphasised, for example, in the personcentred 'VIPS' framework (Brooker, 2007) .
Whilst the affirmation of individuality in dementia is, at least in part, a valiant response to perceptions that selfhood is under threat, one of the consequences of these new regulatory technologies is, I believe, the embedding of regimes of individuality within the whole gamut (Prior, 1993) of care relationships. Individuality, as a state of Being, is not a pre-social phenomenon but is instead, part of the 'collective frameworks within which people organise and report upon their social existence' (Prior, 1993: 6) . Neither is individuality accepted across all cultures, as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1975: 48) highlighted:
'The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures.'
Individuality, then, does not merely reflect subjective experience of dementia but, instead, actively serves to shape it; in as much as persons are expected to think, feel and act as individuals in their dealings with care services. This reification of individuality and the promotion of it in dementia as qua 'good' must be treated with a degree of caution. This is because individuality is not the only means through which selfhood can find full and creative expression in dementia. Indeed, if we suspend our sense of awe for individuality and consider, instead, how families, friendship networks, practitioners and policy makers can contribute to the realisation of Taylor's vision of dementia in the 21 st century (see above), we begin to see alternative goals and avenues for the promotion of selfhood. In contrast to individualism, the project of the self that I outline is based on the assumption that the self is engaged in a constant process of becoming; a process in which people, like the Roman God Janus, look simultaneously to future and past states of Being. Person-centred interventions such as Reminiscence Therapy (Woods, et al, 2005) and Validation Therapy (Bleathman and Morton, 1992) seek to either recognise, preserve or re-unify the self by enabling the (coherent) construction of the person's biographical narrative. In contrast, our goal is not to attempt to revive or repair a hitherto 'broken' self but, instead, to facilitate a rich sociointeractive environment through which a plurality of selves may thrive. Enabling this montage of selves thus requires a concerted effort to refrain from seeking to impose a unifying narrative on the self. Instead, promoting montages of selves can be achieved by adhering to three core principles: respect for dividuality; promoting dialogicality; and embracing intercorporeality.
Part II Respecting dividuality
Dividuality (opposed to individuality) is an approach to personhood that is widely recognised within the anthropological literature yet has, to date, received surprising little attention in relation to dementia. As Marriot (1976) and Strathern (1988) have argued, dividuality is based on the belief that persons are created through processes of sharing and transaction, as opposed to being bounded 'motivational and cognitive universes' (Geertz, 1975: 48) . Whilst dividual approaches to personhood were originally observed in studies of non-Western cultures, the extent to which dividuality is unique to such societies has been the subject of considerable debate (see Smith, 2012) . There is insufficient space to reproduce these arguments here, nor is it essential to the progression of this paper; suffice to say that, 'In all cultures there exists … both dividual and individual modalities or aspects of personhood' (Lipuma, 2000: 131) .
Whilst recognising that the promotion of individuality continues to serve important functions in dementia care, Lipuma's observation prompts us to temper our deep respect for individuality with equal respect for the dividuality of persons. Recognising dividuality in dementia involves developing an appreciation of the transactive qualities of persons;
specifically their ability to give out, from them-selves, 'particles of their own coded substances that may then reproduce in others, something of the nature of the persons in whom they have originated' (Marriott, 1976: 111) . We have all seen this process in action;
for example, whenever a parent tells their child 'I see a lot of my self in you' or when a wife may refer to her husband (or vice versa) as 'My other half'. Within these everyday sayings, the literal overlaps with the metaphorical in ways that highlight the complex and multifaceted sharing of selfhood between bodies (insert footnote). It is precisely through such capacity for transaction that the rich and diverse montages of our selves are able to emerge.
Hence, recognising that we can transmit-and-receive the best of our selves is crucial to the creation of meaningful, egalitarian relationships in dementia.
Promoting dialogicality Dialogicality has been defined as the ability of the human mind to conceive and communicate in relation to otherness (Marková, 2003) . Since the turn of the 21 st century, a number of social psychologists have sought to explore the utility of this concept in their attempts to develop more inter-subjective (as opposed to intrinsic) models of selfhood. One of the most influential, Dialogical Selfhood Theory (DLT), was developed by Herbert Hermans.
According to Hermans, self and other are not mutually distinct but instead co-exist within a single body; as 'a multiplicity of positions among which dialogical relationships can develop' (Hermans, 2001: 243) . In this context, the self may be conceptualised not as a single, unifying perspective, but as a polyphonic novel; that is, a story told by a combination of competing authors. Within our polyphonic selves, therefore, exists 'a plurality of consciousnesses and worlds' that develop in dialogical relationship with each other (Hermans 2001: 245) . Promoting dialogicality in dementia therefore involves attempting to enable this rich (polyphonic) variety of consciousness and worlds to develop, by facilitating the conditions through which dividual selves may enfold-and-transmit aspects of their polyphonic consciousness. This can be done discursively, through the sharing of lived experience, or pre-reflexively, at the level of embodied interaction (see below). Either way, enabling people to come together (both literally and metaphorically) is central to creating the conditions through which dialogicality in dementia can develop.
Embracing intercorporeality
Traditionally, the body has been a neglected focus in relation to selfhood in dementia (Kontos, 2005 , Martin, et al, 2013 , Twigg, 2010 . Although this omission was originally recognised by Kitwood (1999) the subsequent evolution of person-centred care has paid surprisingly little attention to the body as a vehicle for selfhood, which has led to an overemphasis on discursive interventions (Kontos, 2005) . According to Kontos, the person is his or her body, in as much as the self is maintained through the gestures, movements and bodily habits generated by the 'primordial capacity of the body to pre-reflectively perform' (Kontos, 2005: 560) . These aspects of the self, which Kontos describes as embodied selfhood, endure throughout the dementia journey, 'despite the ravages inflicted by neuropathy' (Kontos, 2005: 566) .
Whilst Kontos' work is useful in highlighting the role of the pre-reflexive aspects of the self, it is important to recognise that embodiment and the 'socio-interactive environment' (Kontos, 2005: 557) are not separate entities. Bodies do not exist in a pre-social state but are, instead, constituted and experienced through socio-interactive behaviour (Weiss, 1999) . Embracing this intercorporeal aspect of the self therefore, is to recognise the ways in which selfhood is transacted, pre-reflexively, through embodied interaction.
In this context, intercorporeality refers to the belief that subjective experience does not originate purely from within the body, but is instead formed through our interactions with other embodied Beings. This theory was initially developed by phenomenologist MerleauPonty. In his posthumously published work, Merleau-Ponty (1968) describes the body as a Chiasm; an entity that is simultaneously a material object -with an objective physical presence -and a hub of subjective experience:
ur body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things and otherwise what sees them and touches them; we say, because it is evident, that it unites these two properties within itself, and its double belongingness to the order of 'object' and to the order of the 'subject' reveals to us quite unexpected relations between the two orders.' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 137) Whilst, according to Merleau-Ponty, the chiastic nature of the body provides the basis for intercorporeality, it is through the Flesh Of The World that intercorporeal experience is made possible. This is not flesh in a conventional sense but, rather, an element of Being previously un-categorised within philosophy (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139) . According to Merleau-Ponty, The film provides a series of vignettes that highlight Agnes' attempts to re-define her self in light of her diagnosis of dementia, through her relationship with Nancy. As such, it provides valuable insights into the processes of becoming-self with dementia. According to Agnes, this process involves a "blending and merging" of past and current selves into a hybrid, "third person".
Agnes: "I think what I was doing is clearing my head into saying, "This is how I was. This is me with dementia". And I want to have another head and say "This is me now" the blending and the merging of these two images into the one; into as I am now."
During the documentary, Agnes travels to the Black Isle to visit Nancy, who has been living with dementia for eight years. During their conversations, Agnes tells Nancy of her desire to dialogically transact; in other words, to achieve the self that she perceives in Nancy and which she attributes, in part, to membership of the Scottish Dementia Working Group.
Nancy: "Do you remember the first time we met?
Agnes: Do you know I can hardly remember that. I remember going in; see, at the beginning, when I went into the group, I was cowered and I was quiet and I could hardly string words together, and I was quite intimidated, and I was in awe of the laughter and the energy in the room. I was attracted to your personality because of the laughter and the calm and I was drawn like a magnet.
Nancy: Wow
Agnes: You know, and that's the way it was. Time-wise, we've talked about that; time means nothing … Nancy: That's right
Agnes: … and I don't have an essence of time. That, the dementia has distorted that.
So, you've obtained what I'm hoping to obtain and, with laughter and humour and insight you know, so I think that's what it is; it's just your total humanness."
We are presented with several examples of how Agnes seeks to develop her-self through her transactions with Nancy. Crucially, we see examples of how this dividual self-work is achieved through intercorporeal, pre-reflexive relating. Agnes, for example, is shown by Nancy how to use her body to saw, axe and prepare wood for the fire; a routine feature of Nancy's daily life and therefore part of her embodied selfhood -the gestures, movements and bodily habits performed by Nancy at the pre-reflexive level (Kontos, 2005) -that, until this point, are alien to Agnes. Agnes and Nancy are also filmed mirroring each other's bodies in more synchronised ways; as they practice Tai Chi and Yoga together in the sunshine of Nancy's garden. Through these intercorporeal exchanges, the embodied aspects of Nancy's self become infolded, by Agnes, through a process of 'osmosis'. '[A] species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to weave in a complex, life-sustaining web.' (Tronto, 1993: 103) One of the main contributions of the inter-embodied self, as I see it, is the dissolution at the conceptual level of unhelpful and artificial distinctions between carer and cared-for in dementia; for a corollary of this distinction is that people with dementia are defined solely in terms of their need to receive -as opposed to their ability to provide -care. Such qualitative distinctions serve to construct the care relationship as a one-way street as opposed to a 'lifesustaining web'. Yet, the existence of online communities such as DASNI, and campaigning organisations such as the Scottish and European Dementia Working Groups, are testaments to the agential role that people with a diagnosis of dementia bring to the care assemblage. In addition to obscuring the abilities of people with a diagnosis of dementia, defining persons without a dementia diagnosis as 'carers' risks relegating them to a secondary division within the care assemblage; in that we become interested in their subjectivity only in so far as it impacts upon the (cared-for) person. As Taylor (2012) (Marriott, 1976: 111) . Thus, promotion of inter-embodied selfhood is based on an appreciation of the similarities, rather than the individual differences, of people (both with and without a diagnosis of dementia) which, I believe, is crucial to the promotion of solidarity in care (Barnes, 2012) , which Taylor aspires to.
Thus, by offering an alternative model to that contained within the regime of the self (Rose, 1996) the inter-embodied self leads us to consider new techniques and interventions for the promotion of selfhood in dementia, based upon more holistic definitions of what care is.
Whilst alternatives to person-centred care have previously been developed, these frameworks tend to retain implicit assumptions regarding the individuality of persons (see Hughes, Bamford and May, 2008) . As core principles, respect for dividuality, promoting dialogicality and embracing intercorporeality have much to offer the development of practice frameworks, which seek to build solidarity (as opposed to individualism) in care. This paper provides some initial groundwork upon which practice-based models can be developed.
Whilst the work presented here is largely theoretical, there is, after all, 'nothing more practical than a good theory' (Lewin, 1952: 169) .
Summary and conclusions
In the 21 st century, the landscapes of dementia are shifting (Bartlett, 2012) . These developments are inspiring new theoretical approaches to selfhood and challenging established views that people with dementia are passive recipients, as opposed to active facilitators, in care and in the perpetual process of becoming-self. As we move further into the 21 st century, in which new approaches to the constitution and dynamics of care in dementia are evolving, the artificial distinctions between self and other, carer and cared-for, are beginning to dissolve.
